This is an excerpt from Remote Warfare: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Get your free download from E-International Relations.
In the introduction it was noted that the main objectives of this revised volume were to fill the gaps in our understanding of remote warfare, challenge the prevailing narratives about its use, and scrutinize the practice. Hopefully, by reading this book, readers will get a better understanding of remote warfare than they would when opening the first page. In addition, the three interconnected core themes of this book, discussed again below, have challenged conventional wisdom and exposed some of the serious problems of remote warfare.
First, while it can bring some short-term tactical gains, remote warfare is not a silver bullet to the profound political problems in conflict-affected states. In fact, it can damage peace and stability in states where it is used. Several chapters have shown how the use of remote warfare can exacerbate the drivers of conflict. This is true regardless of whether it is a remote warfare in Syria, as the chapter by Sinan Hatahet has shown, Libya, which was discussed in the conceptual introduction of the editors, or the Sahel zone, as it was examined by Delina Goxho.
Second, remote military engagements often cause significant damage to civilians, despite being presented in “precise”, “surgical” and even “humane” ways. Remote warfare minimizes the risks to a state’s own soldiers, but it shifts the burden of warfare onto the civilian population. As Baraa Shiban’s and Camilla Molyneux’s chapter on Yemen demonstrated, the damage done to civilians by long-distance warfare is not confined to deaths. It can also have a significant economic, educational, and psychological impact on affected communities. Civil damage in remote warfare is also closely related to instability. As Daniel Mahanty pointed out in part of his chapter on security cooperation, civil harm and human rights violations committed by partners can counteract peace initiatives. This can also undermine public confidence in the legitimacy of the partner state and increase the number of dissatisfied who may turn to violence in response to government-sponsored abuse.
After all, remote warfare has significant sociopolitical implications for the states that practice it. The secrecy associated with remote warfare can corrode democratic norms. As Christopher Kinsey and Helene Olsen’s chapter on private military noted, there is a danger that the lack of debate about their use can lead to a democratic deficit where accountability, transparency, and even public approval are either ignored or tacitly marginalized become. According to the chapter by Malte Riemann and Norma Rossi, outsourcing the burdens of war has a deeper effect on the reorganization of modes of remembrance, duty and sacrifice in states. This later made the war appear less visible in democratic societies. Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould warn that if the warfare is no longer visible and scrutinized, there is a danger that the liberal democracies of the West could become more violent in the long run.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are limitations to what can be covered in a book, and there are always areas that remain unexplored. While the articles were deep in their analysis, this volume has only scratched the surface of the scope and breadth of remote warfare. This final chapter examines some of the various subject areas that might be explored in future research on remote warfare. First, however, the important question that will be discussed is whether remote warfare will remain the norm for states, especially in light of increasing “great power competition” and the COVID-19 pandemic. These developments have raised important questions about the future of remote warfare.
Is Remote Warfare Here to Stay?
Lately there has been a lot of talk by international relations scholars, think tanks, the defense community and politicians about the fact that we are once again living in an era of “great power competition” (Dueck 2017; Kaufmann 2019; Elbridge and Mitchell 2020; Mahnken 2020)). The core of the idea is that there has been a move away from global hegemony towards a world where the US, China, and Russia compete for strategic influence, trade and investment dominance, and world leadership in developing and regulating new technologies (O’Rourke 2020). For states, this means that peer competition has become a strategic priority rather than a fight against terrorism. For example, the 2018 National Defense Strategy states: “Strategic international competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern of US national security” (US Department of Defense 2018, 1).
This great narrative has been gaining momentum for some time. In the early 1990s, John Mearsheimer (1990, pp. 5-6) suggested: “The bipolar structure that has shaped Europe since the end of World War II is being replaced by a multipolar structure.” Since then, various writers have studied the military revival Russia (Trenin 2016; Renz 2017), the economic and military rise of China (Kristof 1992; Overholt 1994; Buzan 2010) and the effects of all this on international security.
However, developments over the past decade have strengthened the validity of this narrative. In 2014, due to numerous factors, Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, ringing alarm bells in the West and giving NATO a new purpose. Since then, Russia has expanded its presence in many parts of the world through arms sales, an undeclared but apparently significant presence of mercenaries and special forces overseas, and capacity-building programs for local armed forces (Watson and Karlshøj-Pedersen 2019). China’s “aggressive” trading activity (Lukin 2019), investments in defense technology (Maizland 2020) and human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2019) have also raised concerns in the West. Since President Xi Jinping became China’s leading head of state in 2012, he has been accused of pursuing an ambitious, nationalist agenda abroad. This is evident in China’s claims to have controversial territory in the South China Sea (Nouwens 2020) and against India in the Galwan Valley Wu and Myers 2020) and behavior towards Taiwan (Ford and Gewirtz 2020).
There are also domestic drivers for this rise in “great power competition”. Although hostilities between the powers predate the rise of “strongman politics”, this development is likely to be a major factor. As Lawrence Freedman (2020) recently noted:
In the age of Trump, Xi, and Putin, it’s hard to take seriously the notion that internal affairs have little impact on the logic of great power practice. In addition, internal affairs not only help explain strategic decisions to identify interests and prepare for warfare, but also what the powers that be. The way they govern themselves and regulate their social and economic affairs is part of the influence they wield.
Since taking office in 2016, President Trump has made this great narrative about “great power competition” the centerpiece of US defense and security thinking (Rachman 2019). The Obama administration was certainly concerned about Russia and China as part of the 2015 National Security Strategy outlined (White House 2015). However, the National Security Strategy 2017 (White House 2017, 2) was a formal announcement of this shift in global relations: “After it was dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century […] The competition for great powers returned. In recent comments, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper outlined the US strategic priorities:
For the United States, our long-term challenges, China, No. 1, and Russia, No. 2. And what we are seeing out there is a China that is expanding its military strength, its economic power, its commercial activity. and it’s illegal in many ways – or it uses the international rules-based order against us to continue that growth, acquire technology, and do the things that really undermine ours [and our allies’] Sovereignty that undermines the rule of law that really challenges [Beijing’s] Commitment to human rights.
(quoted in Kristian 2020)
The US National Security Strategy also identifies other emerging powers such as Iran and North Korea as strategic concerns and their attempts to “destabilize regions, threaten Americans and our allies, and brutalize their own people” (DOD 2017, 15).
This rise of the narrative “Great Power Competition” has created new uncertainties for international security, not least for the use of long-distance warfare as a tactical instrument for states. However, there are reasons to doubt that this will spell the end of long-distance warfare or a return to large-scale interventions.
In the era of “great power competition”, states like the USA will depend heavily on partnerships. As Watts, Biegon, and Mahanty noted in their chapters, security cooperation is likely to remain an important tool in American foreign policy. This is likely to be the case for his allies as well. Several countries are considering pursuing an “ongoing engagement” strategy in which a state “has few troops in a country and works with regional and local partners to build influence and knowledge” (Watson 2020b). .
Recent trends also show that states continue to have a strong strategic interest in confronting opponents’ armed forces from the open battlefield, which operate in the gray area and below the threshold of full conflict between states (Knowles and Watson 2018, p. 5 -) 6). Remote approaches are essentially opportunities for states to avoid the economic and political risks of a direct confrontation. The assassination of General Qasem Soleimani earlier this year by a US armed drone strike is an example of how long-range warfare has been used to avoid direct confrontation, as has the use of agents by Iran in the Middle East. Both nations have tried to avoid direct fighting, but in doing so have shifted the risk to local civilians in the areas in which they operate.
In the case of Russia, it is also constrained economically and by staff restrictions. These realities led RAND Corporation to conclude:
There is no evidence that Russia is seeking a large-scale conflict with a near-peer or peer competitor, and indeed Russian leaders seem to understand the disadvantages Russia faces in the event of an ongoing conflict with an adversary like NATO is exposed. (Boston and Massicot 2018)
Putin’s approach to the West so far has largely consisted of cyber operations, disinformation campaigns and targeted attacks (see Thomas 2014; Connell and Vogler 2017; Mejias and Vokuev 2017; Stengel 2019; Splidsboel Hansen 2017). Putin is reasonably competent at working “cheaply” and has also used limited remote military intervention as a broader foreign policy tool. This is likely to continue. Therefore, it is more likely that US or British troops will be found in future confrontations with states like Russia via their military contractors or special forces somewhere in Syria than in a conventional war in Eastern Europe (Knowles and Watson 2018, 6). There is certainly a precedent for that. In February 2018, it was reported that US special forces clashed with Russian security companies working with Syrian forces in a four-hour firefight in eastern Syria (Gibbons-Neff 2018). The heavy Russian losses from this engagement, allegedly 200 soldiers (ibid), and the damage to its reputation could well make the Kremlin hesitate to repeat this type of event. However, this does not rule out a recurrence of skirmishes of a similar nature.
In this sense, it is more likely that military engagement between “great powers” and their allies will take the form of, or at least show elements of, remote warfare. This presents a number of challenges to transparency and accountability – and many of the dangers discussed throughout the book are likely to persist.
The recent COVID-19 outbreak, one of the largest global pandemics in living memory, has undoubtedly increased tensions between China and the West. This tape was completed in the early stages of the outbreak. In just a few months, the spread of the virus has stalled many countries around the world, chronically affecting their economies and social routines. It is estimated that the death toll to date has been over a million (World Health Organization 2020) and the cost to the world economy has been between £ 4.7 and 7.1 trillion (Asia Development Bank 2020). The virus’s origins in Wuhan, a city in central China, and the rapid global spread that followed has led some to blame China for the virus’s effects. However, this growing Sino-Western rivalry still remains below the cusp of a major war and is unlikely to change. Hostilities are likely to come in the form of sanctions, cyber conflict, and potential proxy engagement.
In their response to COVID-19, some governments have taken a highly securitized approach and in some cases used the situation to consolidate power (Roth 2020; Lamond 2020). This has resulted in state security agencies abusing their positions of authority and acting outside the rule of law, often taking overly aggressive measures against the civilian population (Brooks 2020). There is a risk that these measures will damage the relationship between the state and the population, promote grievances, force alienated civilians to join extremist groups and contribute to more violence in the long term (Watson 2020a).
There have been several warnings that non-state armed groups are trying to take advantage of the disruption caused by the pandemic in certain states. In Iraq, Islamic State issued instructions to supporters regarding the virus and began to ramp up its various attacks across the Middle East and other regions (Abu Haneyeh 2020). In the Sahel, another area seen as a prominent battleground for jihadist groups, al-Qaeda members and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara have also tried to capitalize on the outbreak, and attacks against military positions, UN peacekeeping forces and Civilian population carried out (Berger 2020). An analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project database found that violent attacks in the conflict hotspots of sub-Saharan Africa increased 37 percent in the first few months of 2020 when the Virus in the US region (Colombo and Harris 2020). But even before the pandemic, there were several warnings of the resurgence of the Islamic state and the growing presence of Al-Qaeda, not only in Africa, but also in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Felbab-Brown 2019; Hassan 2019; Joffé 2018; Lefèvre 2018; Clarke 2019; Jones Harrington 2018). The bottom line is that non-state armed groups are likely to remain a threat for some time to come.
Hence, it is very likely that remote warfare will be the preferred method to counter them as it is viewed by them as low risk and relatively cheap. Many analysts believe this is the case in the UK. In an expert round table hosted by the Oxford Research Group in early 2020, participants said that the country’s economic and political climate would mean that Britain will continue to take a distant approach to military engagement in the future. In recent years, UK markets have been hit by uncertainty over Brexit, the economy has been crippled due to the COVID-19 responses and the government has been under pressure to cut spending (Watson 2020b). In general, the military, political, and economic pressures that originally led to the dominance of remote warfare are still in place and are likely to intensify (see Chalmers and Jessett 2020). Despite a changing global landscape, remote warfare is likely to continue to dominate the approach of many states, making critical examination of the subject all the more important.
Some future directions of research
A common account of this book is that while remote warfare may be “remote” from a Western perspective, it is part of everyday reality for some communities in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere. It has a significant impact on the civilian population, and much of it is still not reported. As the Shiban and Molyneux chapter on Yemen highlighted, conceptualizations of civil harm in remote warfare need to go beyond civilian deaths and injuries to gain a fuller understanding of its impact on society.
These realities make it important to find and reinforce the voices of the communities in states where remote warfare operations are conducted. The work of investigative journalists, academics, and NGOs has been invaluable in bringing these currently marginalized voices more clearly into focus (see Watling and Shabibi 2018; Pargeter 2017). However, this remains a very limited and constrained research exercise. There are good reasons for it. Field research in the areas of remote warfare is both costly and dangerous (see Bliesemann de Guevara and Kurowska 2020). However, greater involvement of local people’s perspectives on how their communities perceive the use of remote warfare would undoubtedly improve understanding of the phenomenon and give voice to those who have been largely ignored in discussions.
Hearing local voices doesn’t necessarily have to be done through fieldwork. The internet has great potential to provide a platform for marginalized voices. A future on-line tape on remote warfare could be based on commissioning chapters from individuals and groups in theaters where operations have taken place.
This book dealt mainly with the criticism of the use of remote warfare by Western states, particularly with the engagement of the US and Great Britain. While some chapters have certainly examined the non-Western dynamics of remote warfare, there is still a greater emphasis on Western approaches. Western states rely heavily on remote warfare, and so it makes sense for researchers in western democracies to turn their attention to the activities of their own governments and military, as there is a greater chance of stimulating change. In addition, the general lack of debate about remote warfare in the West makes it imperative for researchers to lead the way in raising awareness on these issues.
Still, expanding the scope of the case studies to explore non-Western approaches to remote warfare could be a fruitful avenue for scholars. There is, of course, no shortage of literature dealing with the use of remote combat approaches by Russia, Iran, China, or the Gulf States (Mumford 2013; Berti and Guzansky 2015; Renz 2016; Chivvas 2017; Fridman 2018; Kuzio) and D’Anieri 2018 , 25-61; Fabian 2019; War 2018; Krieg and Rickli 2019). There are also several reports of the use of remote tactics by developing countries, particularly in Africa (Abbink 2003; Tubiana and Walmsley 2008; Craig 2012; Tamm 2014; Isaacs-Martin 2015; 2018; Krieg and Rickli 2018; Tapscott2019; International Crisis Group 2020) . A comparison between the experiences of democratic and less democratic states with remote warfare would, however, be worthwhile. It can help researchers understand the differences and similarities between states’ use of remote approaches. A particularly interesting question on this topic could be whether there is a connection between the type of regime and remote warfare and, if so, which drivers are behind it. Since remote warfare is likely a tool that has been used by states for some time, a greater focus on how approaches to remote warfare differ around the world could become even more important in the future.
The technological tools used in remote warfare today, such as drones, will remain in the short term and will be an important area of future research. Scientists and researchers will continue to raise awareness of how the use of this technology is affecting the civilian population on the ground and what impact this has, particularly on their contribution to increased radicalization and subsequent instability (see Saeed et al. 2019). However, as noted in the chapters, there are concerns that technological advances in defense are outperforming the legal and moral framework at home and abroad.
The increasing flow of global data driven by new information technologies is an example of this. As Julian Richards noted in his chapter on the exchange of information, there is a risk that highly complex and integrated messaging systems that share increasing amounts of data on an industrial scale could allow information to be misused by states. In his chapter, Richards notes that there are public fears in Western democracies that they are creeping towards a global “surveillance society” and that sharing information with the authoritarian regime could contribute to major human rights violations.
On the same general theme, Jennifer Gibson’s chapter highlighted the dangers of data-driven approaches to targeted killing by armed drone strikes and the challenges this activity poses to international law. As Gibson argued, in places like Yemen, life and death decisions are made based on loose collections of data compiled by local algorithms with limited intelligence. This raises difficult questions about whether technology aids or hinders the processes that cause pilots to launch deadly drone attacks.
Joseph Chapa, whose research included interviews with armed drone pilots, was more optimistic about how the distance enabled by technology in remote warfare affects pilots’ judgment. In his chapter, Chapa argued that drone technology actually enables pilots to use human judgment when making life and death decisions. Nonetheless, Chapa also pointed out the potential dangers that new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) pose to this process.
Indeed, perhaps the greatest concern about future developments in military technology is the emergence of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and AI (see Scharre 2014, 2019; Sharkey 2017; Schwarz 2018). This is an emerging global phenomenon with global military spending on AWS and AI projected to reach $ 16 billion and $ 18 billion, respectively, by 2025 (Sander and Meldon 2014). A growing number of states and non-governmental organizations are calling on the international community to regulate or even ban AWS (Cummings 2017, 2). Of course, there are legitimate ethical concerns about AWS. As the chapter by Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss pointed out, these technologies could challenge existing norms for the use of force, as they may affect human judgment. This could have a huge impact on civilians in warfare. Their chapter states: “The legal definition of who is a civilian and who is a fighter is not written in a way that it can be easily programmed into the AI, and the machines lack situational awareness and the ability to make that decision necessary things to close. ‘
However, some are more optimistic about AI, especially its relationship with civil damage. Although researchers in various disciplines are cautious about the growth of this technology, they believe that such systems, when used in the right conditions, have potentially more “positive” uses (for a good overview of key debates, see ICRC 2019). Regarding the impact on war and civil harm, Larry Lewis, director of the Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence, has argued that the proper use of machine learning algorithms can help minimize civilian casualties during armed conflict:
While the history of warfare abounds with examples of technology that can kill and maim more people more efficiently, technology can also lower the tragic cost of war. For example, precision-guided and small ammunition can limit what is known as collateral damage, the killing and maiming of civilians and other non-combatants.
In the future, more open debate, dialogue and the dissemination of accurate information will be crucial. This means that there is a common understanding of the risks and opportunities to better promote security for the military technology applications. The lack of discussion and progress among UN member states on this issue shows (see Haner and Garcia 2019) that the international community has a lot of catching up to do on this issue.
Forward-Looking: The Value of Intellectual Pluralism
As mentioned in the introduction, an event was jointly organized by the Oxford Research Group and the University of Kent last year, bringing together stakeholders from various academic disciplines, the NGO community, civil society and the military to discuss remote warfare . The event demonstrated the importance of engagement in various professional areas, both as a learning experience and to promote conversation (Watts and Biegon 2019). At the conference, those from the military and NGO sectors, communities that do not normally share platforms, shared their experiences with remote warfare. This book has captured some of this diversity by highlighting the key debates that permeate the use of remote warfare.
As this volume has shown, remote warfare affects many areas of society at home and abroad. It’s not just a military issue, it’s a very social one. An inclusive, open and diverse dialogue and debate between the actors involved in remote warfare are therefore crucial if science is to continue to grow. Unless researchers move beyond professional silos and work together, there is a risk of creating a stale discursive environment in which research clusters get into circular discussions in their own echo chambers. The chapters in this book have shown that the use of remote warfare poses several significant problems, and that only through community-to-community discussion can progress be made in solving these problems. So this book is part of the beginning of that process, not the end.
 Eine erste Datenerfassung hierzu finden Sie in einer Präsentation von Yvonni Efstathiou zum Regimetyp und zur Verwendung nichtstaatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/event-podcast-the-oversight-and-accountability -von-Fernkriegsführung
Abbink, John. 2003. “Äthiopien – Eritrea: Stellvertreterkriege und Aussichten auf Frieden am Horn von Afrika.” Zeitschrift für zeitgenössische Afrikastudien21 (3), 407–426.
Abu Haneyeh, Hassan. 2020. „Wie COVID-19 die Wiedergeburt des globalen Dschihadismus erleichterte.“ Pulitzer Center. 3. Juni. https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/how-covid-19-facilocated-rebirth-global-jihadism
Asiatische Entwicklungsbank. 2020. „Aktualisierte Bewertung der potenziellen wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von COVID-19.“ ADB Briefs, Nr. 133. Mai.
Berger, Flore, 2020. „Business as usual für Dschihadisten in der Sahelzone trotz Pandemie.“ IISS-Analyse. 29. April. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/csdp-jihadism-in-the-sahel
Berti, Benedetta und Guzansky, Yoel. 2014. “Saudi-Arabiens Außenpolitik gegenüber dem Iran und der Stellvertreterkrieg in Syrien: Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Kapitel?” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs8 (3): 25–34.
Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit, und Bøås, Morten, Hrsg. 2020. Feldforschung in Bereichen internationaler Intervention: Ein Leitfaden für die Forschung in gewalttätigen und geschlossenen Kontexten. Räume des Friedens, der Sicherheit und der Entwicklung. Bristol University Press.
Boston, Scott und Dara Massicot. 2017. “Die russische Art der Kriegsführung: Eine Grundierung.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE231.html
Brooks, Lewis. 2020. “Die Rolle des Sicherheitssektors bei der Reaktion von COVID-19 Eine Gelegenheit,” besser wieder aufzubauen “?” Saferworld.
Buzan, Barry. 2010. “China in der internationalen Gesellschaft: Ist ein” friedlicher Aufstieg “möglich?” Das chinesische Journal für internationale Politik3 (1): 5–36.
Chalmers, Malcolm und Will Jessett. 2020. „Will Defense und die integrierte Überprüfung: Eine Testzeit.“ Whitehall-Berichte. RUSI. 26. März.
Chivvis, Christopher S., 2017. „Russische„ hybride Kriegsführung “verstehen: und was dagegen getan werden kann: Nachtrag.“ Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468z1.html
Clarke, Colin. P., 2019. Nach dem Kalifat: Der islamische Staat und die zukünftige terroristische Diaspora. John Wiley und Söhne.
Columbo, Emilia und Marielle Harris. 2020. „Extremistische Gruppen verstärken ihre Operationen während des Ausbruchs der Covid-19 in Afrika südlich der Sahara.“ Zentrum für strategische und internationale Studien. 1. Mai.
Craig, Dylan. 2012. Stellvertreterkrieg der afrikanischen Staaten, 1950–2010. Amerikanische Universität.
Dueck, Colin. 2017. “Eine Ära der Großmachtführer.” Das nationale Interesse. 7. November.
Colby, Elbridge A. und A. Wess Mitchell. 2020. “Das Zeitalter des Großmachtwettbewerbs: Wie die Trump-Administration die amerikanische Strategie umgestaltete.” Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 99: 118. Januar / Februar.
Connell, Michael und Sarah Vogler. 2017. „Russlands Ansatz zur Cyberkriegsführung (1Rev).“ Zentrum für Marineanalysen Arlington, USA.
Cummings, Missy. 2017. „Künstliche Intelligenz und die Zukunft der Kriegsführung.“ London: Chatham House.
Efstathiou, Yvonni. „Regimetyp und Fernkrieg: Eine Hauptanalyse des internationalen Krieges“. Oxford Research Group. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/event-podcast-the-oversight-and-accountability-of-remote-warfare
Fabian, Sandor. 2019. “Die russische hybride Kriegsstrategie – weder russisch noch strategisch.” Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsanalyse, 35 (3): 308–325.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2017. „Wiederaufleben des Terrorismus in Afghanistan: Al-Qaida, ISIS und darüber hinaus.“ Unterausschuss für Zeugnisse über Terrorismus, Nichtverbreitung und Handel des Ausschusses für auswärtige Angelegenheiten des Hauses. Brookings Institute.
Ford, Lindsey W. und Julian Gewirtz. 2020. “Chinas Aggression nach dem Coronavirus verändert Asien.” Außenpolitik. 18. Juni.https: //foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/china-india-aggression-asia-alliances/
Freedman, Lawrence. 2020. “Wer will eine Großmacht sein?” PRISMA, 8 (4): 2–15.
Fridman, Ofer. 2018. Russische „hybride Kriegsführung“: Wiederaufleben und Politisierung. New York: Oxford University Press.
Friedman, Uri. 2019. “Das neue Konzept, über das alle in Washington sprechen.” Der Atlantik, 6. August.
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. 2018. “Wie sich ein 4-stündiger Kampf zwischen russischen Söldnern und US-Kommandos in Syrien abspielte.” New York Times. 24. Mai.
Haner, Justine und Denise Garcia. 2019. “Das Wettrüsten der künstlichen Intelligenz: Trends und Weltmarktführer in der Entwicklung autonomer Waffen.” Globale Politik10 (3): 331–337.
Hassan, Hassan. 2018. “ISIS ist bereit für ein Wiederaufleben.” Der Atlantik. 26. August.
Human Rights Watch. 2019. Chinas globale Bedrohung der Menschenrechte. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global
International Crisis Group. 2020. ‘Averting Proxy Wars in the Eastern DR Congo and Great Lakes.’ Briefing 150 / Africa. 23 January.
International Committee on the Red Cross. 2019. ‘Artificial Intelligence and Armed Conflict’, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog. ICRC.
Isaacs-Martin, Wendy. 2015. ‘The motivations of warlords and the role of militias in the Central African Republic.’ Conflict Trends, 2015(4): 26–32.
Joffé, George. 2016. ‘The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq.’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, 27(1): 1–21.
Jones, Seth G., Charles Vallee, Danika Newlee, Nicholas Harrington, Clayton Sharb, and Hannah Byrne. 2018. ‘The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat.’ Center for Strategic International Studies. 20 November.
Knowles, Emily, and Abigail Watson. 2018. Remote Warfare: Lessons Learned from Contemporary Theatres. Oxford Research Group.
Krieg, Andreas. 2017. Defining Remote Warfare: The Rise of the Private Military and Security Industry. Oxford Research Group.
Krieg, Andreas and Jean-Marc Rickli. 2018. ‘Surrogate warfare: the art of war in the 21st century?’ Defence Studies, 18(2): 113–130.
———. 2019. Surrogate Warfare:: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
Kristian, Bonnie. 2020. ‘Esper’s dark vision for US-China conflict makes war more likely.’ DefenseNews. 19 March.
Kristof, Nicholas. 1992. ‘The rise of China.’ Foreign Affairs, 72: 59. November/December.
Kuzio, Taras, and Paul D’Anieri. 2018. Sources of Russia’s great power politics: Ukraine and the challenge to the European order. Bristol: E-International Relations.
Lamond, James. 2020. ‘Authoritarian Regimes Seek To Take Advantage of the Coronavirus Pandemic.’ Center for American Progress. 6 April.
Lefèvre, Raphaël. 2018. ‘The resurgence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib.’ The Journal of North African Studies, 23(1-2): 278–281.
Lewis, Larry. 2018. ‘AI for Good in War; Beyond Google’s “Don’t Be Evil:”’ Breaking Defence. 29 June.
Lukin, Alexander. 2019. ‘The US–China Trade War and China’s Strategic Future.’ Survival, 61(1): 23–50.
Mahnken, Thomas. 2020. Forging the Tools of 21st Century Great Power Competition. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Maizland, Lindsay. 2020. ‘China’s Modernizing Military.’ Council on Foreign Relations. 5 February.
Mearsheimer, John. 1990. ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.’ International Security, 15(1): 5–56.
Mejias, Ulises, and Nikolai Vokuev. 2017. ‘Disinformation and the media: the case of Russia and Ukraine.’ Media, Culture and Society, 39(7): 1027–1042.
Mumford, Andrew. 2013. Proxy warfare. Cambridge: Polity.
Nouwens, Veerle. 2020. ‘Who Guards The “Maritime Silk Road”?’ War On The Rocks. 27 June.
Overholt, William H., 1994. The rise of China: How economic reform is creating a new superpower. WW Norton and Company.
O’Rourke, Ronald. 2020. Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. 29 May.
Pargeter, Alison. 2017. After the fall: Views from the ground of international military intervention in post-Gadhafi Libya. London: Remote Control Project. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/after-the-fall-views-from-the-ground-of-international-military-intervention-in-post-gadhafi-libya
Rachman, Gideon. 2019. ‘Trump era puts great power rivalry at centre of US foreign policy.’ Financial Times. 21 January.
Renz, Bettina. 2016. ‘Russia and “hybrid warfare.”’ Contemporary Politics, 22(3): 283–300.
———. 2018. Russia’s Military Revival. Polity.
Saeed, Luqman. et al. 2019. Drone Strikes and Suicide Attacks in Pakistan: An Analysis. Action Against Armed Violence.
Sander, Alison, and Meldon Wolfgang. ‘2014. BCG Perspectives: The Rise of Robotics.’ Boston Consulting Group.
Scharre, Paul. 2014. Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm. CNAS.
Scharre, Paul. 2019. ‘The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race.’ Foreign Affairs, 9(3). May/June.
Schwarz, Elke. 2018. ‘The (Im)possibility of Meaningful Human Control for Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Humanitarian Law and Policy.’ ICRC. 29 August. https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/08/29/im-possibility-meaningful-human-control-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/
Sharkey, Noel. 2017. ‘Why Robots Should Not be Delegated with the Decision to Kill.’ Connection Science, 29(2): 177–186.
Splidsboel Hansen, Flemming. 2017. Russian hybrid warfare: a study of disinformation (No. 2017: 06). DIIS Report.
Stengel, Richard. 2014. ‘Russia today’s disinformation campaign.’ Dipnote: US Department of State Official Blog. US Department of State.
Tamm, Hemming. 2014. The dynamics of transnational alliances in Africa, 1990–2010: governments, rebel groups, and power politics, PhD thesis. Oxford: University of Oxford.
Tapscott, Rebecca. 2019. ‘Conceptualizing militias in Africa.’ In Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics. Oxford.
The White House. 2015. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf
The White House. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
Thomas, Timothy. 2014. ‘Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27(1): 101–130.
Trenin, Dmitri. 2016. ‘The revival of the Russian military: How Moscow reloaded.’ Foreign Affairs, 95(3): 23–29.
United States Department of Defence. 2018. 2018 National Defense Strategy.
Watling, Jack. and Shabibi, Namir. 2018. Defining Remote Warfare: British Training and Assistance Programmes in Yemen, 2004–2015. Oxford Research Group.
Watson, Abigail, and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen. 2019. Fusion Doctrine in Five Steps: Lessons Learned from Remote Warfare in Africa. Oxford Research Group. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/fusion-doctrine-in-five-steps-lessons-learned-from-remote-warfare-in-africa
Watson, Abigail. 2020a. ‘Planning for the World After COVID-19: Assessing the Domestic and International Drivers of Conflict.’ Oxford Research Group. 23 April. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/planning-for-the-world-after-covid-19-assessing-the-domestic-and-international-drivers-of-conflict
———.. 2020b. ‘Questions for the Integrated Review #2: How to Engage: Deep and Narrow or Wide and Shallow?’ Oxford Research Group. 14 July. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/questions-for-the-integrated-review-2-how-to-engage-deep-and-narrow-or-wide-and-shallow
Watts, Tom, and Biegon, Rubrick. 2018. ‘Conceptualising Remote Warfare: Past, Present and Future.’ Oxford Research Group. 23 May.
World Health Organisation. 2020. ‘WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard.’ https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
Win, Ju, and Steven Lee Myers. 2020. ‘Battle in the Himalayas.’ New York Times. 18 June. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/18/world/asia/china-india-border-conflict.html