2020 was a year of domestic lockdowns, closed international borders, and dramatic withdrawals for world trade and tourism. A new type of coronavirus discovered in Wuhan, China, spread around the globe, causing the largest pandemic since 1918 flu. Unexpected shock waves affected both national and international relations. The sudden arrival of COVID-19 was a crash course for globalization. In the first few months of the pandemic, there was hardly any reliable data. This could have strengthened the bonds of diffuse reciprocity between states and communities. In retrospect, after more than 150 million cases and 3 million victims, the international community would have benefited greatly from a set of common rules that were indivisibly and indivisibly controlled by international public authorities. That was not the case. With regional and nationwide bans unilaterally introduced in the first half of 2020, the technical authority of the World Health Organization was in checkmate.
COVID-19 was a missed opportunity for multilateralism. With an open lack of international leadership overlapping with self-sufficient politics as the pandemic progressed, the results largely detrimentally affected multilateral cooperation (which had already declined over the century). National decisions undermined collective responsibility and foregone the ultimate goal (stopping the spread of the disease). In addition, leading multilateral agents performed sub-optimally in 2020. Under Donald Trump, the United States (a challenged superpower) gave up multilateralism and made a commitment to “America great again“Instead of a long-lasting fortune of hegemony. That empty seat left additional problems for the multilateral machinery. The European Union was plagued by a lack of coordination, including the Member States (Italy, Spain) that were early epicentres of the pandemic, and little could be done to to ease international turmoil. The Schengen zone was closed for national security reasons as the member states provided economic aid and medical services on their own. In this context, the EU could hardly claim a global leadership role – although its support for multilateralism (at least rhetorical) remained unchanged.
China – where the pandemic began in late 2019 – remained unremarkable, apart from an ambivalent relationship with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although its lockdown guidelines significantly reduced domestic disease levels, China showed disagreement over disclosure of COVID-19 data and correlated guidelines to international audiences. Therefore, it might not exercise much soft power.
Multilateralism has been under stress since 2020, but the new coronavirus wasn’t a game changer. COVID-19 deepened the long-term decline of international institutions that marked the 21stst Century. Against this background, there were broad signs of hope for future international cooperation in the media, governments and universities. First, by Christmas 2020, the EU and the UK duly reached a trade deal that removes (at least for a while) concerns about Brexit. As a result of the US presidential election, a victorious Joe Biden was portrayed as a key element in reassessing America’s commitment to multilateralism, the rule of law – perhaps even some sort of international leadership. Both the EU and Biden governments have pledged to provide billions of packages of economic aid.
COVID-19 has not hindered international cooperation or domestic change en route. This should be cause for celebration. However, this line of reasoning does not only bring good news for one particular brand of international cooperation, multilateralism. On the contrary, the aggregate brings additional warning signals for an already weakened and challenged multilateral architecture. The same events that mobilized the heart and mind towards a bright future confirm long-term adverse trends.
In this article, we examine a number of developments that have exacerbated the case of multilateralism. Economic aid packages provided by national governments and community institutions to maintain jobs create centrifugal effects that have a negative impact on international trade and cooperation. The rising debt raises further doubts. These traits limit the impact of the Biden leadership – aside from a long-term bearish US status compared to emerging markets and other competitors. In addition, the vaccination frenzy that marked 2021 was carried out with little to no coordination and a lack of rules.
We then show latent possibilities for multilateral cooperation in a pandemic context, through which multilateralism can be effectively mobilized in the short term in order to maintain its sustainability in a (still hypothetical) post-COVID world. In combination, such possibilities can weld together broken threads of a multilateral framework.
- A change in US foreign policy that replaces Trump’s autarchical impulses with a cautious approach. Early initiatives in Biden’s foreign policy could position the US – a controversial superpower barely affected by a pandemic and struggling to keep up with the pace of the emerging powers – as a “unifier” that facilitates convergence through multilateral agreements, rather than one Hegemon.
- Then we approach the current multilateral agenda and look for new articulations between states, societies and institutions. After global efforts to produce vaccines in record time (a huge success), 2021 was shaped by public-private partnerships to deliver vaccines to vulnerable populations in a timely manner in accordance with the justice rules. The EU-led and WHO coordinated COVAX facility is an early sign of multilateralism to come.
- Finally, we examine how the unintended consequences of stimulus packages passed as part of a pandemic can benefit multilateral initiatives in the long term. Such packages, proposed by both the EU and the US, could partially restore global economic exchanges and (if indirectly) benefit other policies and multilateral agreements related to longer transitions to a “greener economy” (one of China developed approach).
Rise and Fall: The United States in a “New World Order”
The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized a structural change in international relations. A distorted order – one that would arguably require a more sophisticated type of leadership to maintain (Gaddis 1986, p. 108) – replaced the relatively simpler bipolar structure of the Cold War.
In early 1991, after the Second Gulf War, the President of the United States, George Bush, announced a “new world order” as the leader of a victorious coalition sanctioned by the United Nations. According to Bush Sr., post Cold War international traffic would follow the rule of law to promote international solidarity, which is channeled through multilateral channels. Until then, this representation of the international order reflected the image of a self-confident, victorious superpower.
Thirty years later, an angry mob struck the United States Congress, inspired by President Donald Trump’s reluctance to concede defeat to former Vice President Joe Biden. This deadly attack took place amid the coronavirus epidemic that killed more than half a million Americans.
This overlap of unprecedented events shocked audiences at home and abroad and provided further evidence of democratic fallout on a global scale. It also revealed the precarious international stance of the US, the country with the highest number of COVID-19 cases (more than 32 million). Because of polarization within the parties (which prevented a legislative response to excesses by the executive branch), the Trump administration has been unable to set an example for Western democracies, significant institutional investment, or sustainable leadership on the world stage.
The contrast between 1991 and 2021 provides the backdrop for President Biden’s announcement that “America’s back”. In the meantime, Which America?
At the end of the Cold War, the US economy represented 29% of world GDP. 12 years later, Osama bin Laden sent videos from his cave hiding in Afghanistan to celebrate the double decline of globalized capitalism – the World Trade Center. By then, US GDP was approaching 1/3 of the global totalafter a decade of economic growth. However, since the 2008 global crisis sparked by the collapse of American real estate, the US has accounted for less than 1/4 of global GDP and was not one of the fastest growing industrialized countries. Similar numbers can be seen in the patterns of global trade and investment. When the World Trade Organization began, Bill Clinton presided over 13% of world exports and 15% of imports. Now that the WTO was embroiled in a nationalist war heralded by Trump and waged in straitjackets since Barack Obama’s administration, the numbers have dropped to 10% and 13%. The US provided around 1/4 of the world’s FDI at the turn of the century. Now it offers less than 1/5.
The Biden government has a long, hard road ahead of it to level the playing field with China, India, Japan, the EU and emerging economies. Such a recovery could benefit from a multilateral path resulting from recurring isolation tours.
Recourse to isolationism has been a recurring feature of US foreign policy, coupled with self-sufficient state of emergency, nativism, economic protectionism, and an unwillingness to make strategic commitments outside America (Kupchan, 2020). Between George W. Bush and Trump, the great victor of the Cold War reduced the width of his foreign traffic (Knudsen, 2019). Subsequent administrations, which have invested in multiple dimensions of self-sufficiency and which are expressed in Trump’s “America First” opening speech, are looking unfavorably for competitiveness domestically versus emerging competitors abroad. Instead of relying on a collective security system (the UN 1991), over the 21stst Century US administrations resorted to Coalitions of the willing for interventions in the Middle East – sometimes avoiding consideration by the UN body (as in Iraq, 2003). Such interventions ended up being little more than a costly distraction from the competition for great powers. There was no need for multilateral institutions (UNESCO, WHO). Even multilateral institutions that were built with explicit American support (WTO, successor to GATT) were eventually undermined by administrations as different as those led by Barack Obama and Donald Trump. US allies often felt like a reluctant superpower was turning its back on the world. There was enough concern that multilateral institutions would decline accordingly.
A challenged superpower can hardly afford isolationism. The cost of building walls against competitors (not enemies) falls back into a less predictable environment and opens windows of opportunism as well as revisionism. The bottom line of striving for self-sufficiency in an interdependent world is frustrating. The spontaneous, gradual responses to global challenges proved disastrous in 2020. After a year of pandemic of international bottleneck leadership, a revamped US role is at stake.
If Biden invested in a pragmatic, rules-based international order, that alone would not be enough to promote continued stability. Even so, a different type of leadership could still make a difference.
A change of guard, a change of leadership
Leadership – the ability to overcome barriers to negotiation, either by solving or bypassing them (Young, 1991) – is an important contributor to determining collective outcomes. In the face of a changing world order, contrasting characteristics of leadership make a difference to a multilateral system.
Structural leadership mobilizes systemic asymmetries in favor of a dominant player. Through “arm twisting”, incentives and the formation of coalitions, dominance is transformed into a decisive trade. Such techniques have been actively used by the Trump administration. For example, the “arm twisting” in trade policy ultimately convinced the North American partners to abolish NAFTA because of a reduced agreement. The building of a coalition proved to be crucial for a successful attempt to have Israel recognized by a growing number of states in the Middle East through the Abraham Agreement.
However, from a multilateral point of view, these measures proved extremely detrimental. The punishment of bilateral trade policy was carried out at the expense of the WTO and sparked protectionism worldwide. Leaving the Paris Agreement and blaming the WHO for the coronavirus pandemic outbreak have devastated key issues of collective action. In retrospect, Trump’s leadership claims were dramatically curtailed by the self-sufficient impulses of his government. In the nuclear field, allies were confused when they attacked North Korea and fought Iran at the same time. The results were not favorable either to the non-proliferation regime or to US aspirations. It is uncertain whether the sum total of these activities made America “first” or “great again”.
In contrast, Entrepreneurship uses insight and creativity to identify and bring to light potential mutual gains. A large number of actors involved in collective risk of action and with a high probability of overlapping that there is a surplus of a negotiator advocate this type of leadership, which is associated with the provision of private or public goods. It helps to be supported by an atmosphere of urgency or crisis – both contingencies that are available to Biden.
The first 100 days of the new administration showed a relentless determination to undo Trump’s policies on multilateral institutions: re-entering the Paris Agreement, re-engaging WHO, and moving closer to China in fighting climate change. Reversing a longstanding multilateral withdrawal, however, requires comprehensive strategies to combat global asymmetries at a relatively lower cost – reshaping multilateral spaces to accommodate international circumstances.
The cost of maintaining international order and the likelihood that such order will persist has been a major feature of US foreign policy debates since the end of the Cold War. Given the limited resources at its disposal amid international turmoil, Biden’s reassessment of multilateralism is not surprising. As relative inexpensive and permanent Organizational form (Martin 1991, p.785), multilateralism remains convincing from the point of view of a far-sighted, powerful agent. In order to take the multilateral path, however, one must also show a great willingness to share the burden and not only “a multitude of options in an uncoordinated manner“(Young 1991, 297).
In April 2021, the first signs of a newly discovered disposition for international coordination were shown. To warm up the COP-26 conference in Glasgow, Biden invited 40 heads of state to a virtual Earth Day 2021 summit. This minilateral forum was in stark contrast to Trump’s abrasive isolation. Biden tried to deal with differences that were consistent with institutional commitments and even brought polarizing numbers (like populist Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro) to the table. Demonstrating that everyone is welcome in setting the agenda is an important step in improving normative behavior. If no one is forgotten during legislation, no one can claim to be above the law. In addition, Biden built on flexible commitments from the Paris Agreement by offering additional CO2 emissions reductions that were consistent with the pandemic schedule (creating room for maneuver, welcomed by the current disorder in national public policies and indicating possible convergences).
In the event of a diplomatic postponement, no claims will be made that are necessarily endowed with general attraction. Still, it advocates an open door stance towards inclusion and learning. Such practices build bridges across social divisions, although problem solving remains a more demanding task.
By acting like that primus inter paresBiden took on a different brand of leadership. By building priorities (a role that requires humility and patience), the US acted as Unifier rather than a hegemon.
From disorder to convergence: European Union after COVID-19
COVID-19 reached the end of previous crisis cascades in European integration (in terms of economy, terrorism and refugees) and caused additional damage in a terrible landscape. By 2020, the European audience could be excused if they did not follow the advice of the communitarian or national authorities – in which case they did not speak the same language among themselves.
Eventually, the EU achieved some common ground in vaccine distribution and economic aid. By December 2020 it will be 750 billion euros Temporary recovery tool (NextGenerationEU) has been revealed. Member States have strengthened their community engagement and cooperation, reconciling internal problems and circumstances on the same basis, by adopting a number of core principles (which are tangibly compatible with multilateralism). In view of the fact that no Member State should be left to its own devices, European policies began to pool medical resources in order to share them according to different needs (namely to prioritize the epicentres). After production deficiencies and delayed implementation, common rules for buyers (transparency and equality) were enforced at community level.
At the same time, the EU pursued vigorous vaccine diplomacy. Through public-private partnerships, the community donated more than 80 million doses of vaccine to 42 non-community states. Liaising with civil society networks and sub-national organizations proved crucial in circumventing national competition for different brands of vaccine. Not to be overlooked, the EU (via the pharmaceutical institutions of its member states) is the largest COVID-19 exporter in the world.
Since the end of 2020, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, has criticized “vaccine nationalism” for reasons of human rights. Calls for the switch from COVID-19 vaccines global public goods grew only after that. Such normative attempts by the main multilateral organization overlapped in early 2021 with the European convergence of national policies within the COVAX facility.
COVAX (Global access to COVID-19 vaccines) – a joint effort by WHO and the public-private alliance GAVI (Global alliance for vaccines and immunization) – Providing a launch pad for global pandemic management by pooling resources, sharing information, minimizing risk, maximizing procurement and delivery of health services. Despite recurring asymmetries, states can work together through this platform: the wealthier pool resources to buy vaccines for everyone (including not only middle- and low-income states with precarious vaccination coverage, but also themselves). An important multilateral dimension comes to the fore: Everyone should be there from the start.
COVAX’s critical contribution to global vaccination efforts can be sustained in the future through multilateral channels. By accessing vaccines a Human rightinstead of one Outward appearance treated in ad hoc Fashion, global community may be ready to meet other pandemics. Multilateralism can benefit from this recontextualization – and international relations already have relevant precedents.
With more than 150 million cases worldwide, the learning curve of the current pandemic has already proven immensely costly. One of the lessons from the COVID-19 era was that in a future pandemic context, timely access to vaccines should be treated as such Basic need – Promote equality and effectively combat the spread of dangerous and unknown ailments.
After decades of relentless disputes, growing demands and skirmishes between developing and industrialized countriesbasic needs” to become something mainstream Working together approach to development. In this case, governments, companies and the Third Sector, taking into account the GDP target contributions of ODA, can set up a permanent fund to fight pandemics, which is controlled by the WHO and jointly managed by civil society and through regular donations (according to the COVAX budget ) is supported. This proposal would arguably come at a lower cost than the 2020 pandemic depression.
A New Multilateral Agenda for the Complexity of Pandemics
The year 2019 ended with Brexit Controversies over regional integration, ongoing skirmishes of trade disputes between the US and China making headlines in the omnipresent shadow of climate change. In contrast, 2020 ended with global debt, highlighting the largest economic decline since 1929 amid a pandemic.
The multilateral agenda shifted abruptly, although the multilateral institutions held back. During this shift, key institutions remained underfunded, highly controversial (or even demoralized), inefficient, or viewed as insufficiently representative in various thematic areas (Chatham House 2021).
In the absence of open guidance, little or no coordination of national efforts to contain COVID19 has been identified. After a year of lockdown, 2021 ushered in a vaccination frenzy that delivered more than 1 billion vaccine doses. Despite this remarkable feat (various vaccines zealously made in record time), there has been no general withdrawal of the disease caused by new strains of coronavirus from different parts of the world. In addition, multiple platforms fought for the same constituencies, apparently with no road rules to follow. The emerging problem of “health passports” also raised concerns about the possible resumption of transcontinental travel.
By Indivisibility & diffuse reciprocityMultilateralism turns private goods into public goods. A translation of individual interests into common goals is necessary in order to achieve convergence in every subject area of international relations (Krasner, 1982). Such traits were absent during the Trump era, and a demoralized WHO could not offer that kind of appeal. Despite adopting this scenario, Biden could have a different stake in this regard.
It is ironic, however, that in the year that international trade reached its lowest point in the century and its greatest decline since the interwar period, both the EU and the UK made every effort to secure a trade deal beforehand Brexit (and calendar) passed – to avoid a relapse into WTO rules. Even in difficult times, multilateral routes were more likely to be prevented than sought.
Suddenly complex societies were faced with a simultaneous supply and demand crisis of unknown magnitude. Global growth disappeared, 85% of assets collapsed compared to 2019. The restriction prevented the adoption of countercyclical measures (government-imposed fiscal incentives plus large infrastructure projects), which were replaced by tax cuts, credit mechanisms, bond issues and massive cash transfers. In a landscape of lower wages, salaries, claims, investments, international trade, and enormous budget deficits, the spiral of crisis culminated in an increase in national responses to poor collective action.
An outstanding feature of this resilient “Age of the dealAre economic aid packages installed under COVID-19. They will remain of central importance for the foreseeable future. As already mentioned, in November 2020 the EU replaced disjointed measures by presenting an economic package worth € 750 billion. Before that, agencies like the US and Singapore have spent 15% of their GDP on recovery efforts. That task proved more difficult for Asian and African countries with lower HDIs and scarce reserves – implying global debt escalation, accompanied by claims that big investors (like China) are offering waiver packages – a reprisal of the 2008 scenes?
The tunnel vision that presides over the aid packages is closely linked to the nation state as an economic unit. The expectations that such measures will ultimately lead to productivity, employment, competitiveness and prosperity are leveled in the short term by protective measures, favorable treatment of local businesses, further bureaucratisation and centralization, and skepticism towards “foreigners”. Well-known scenes after a crisis can lead to further tailspins. National problems are likely to have a long-lasting legacy for institutionalized global cooperation. Symptomatically, Biden announced a $ 1.9 trillion stimulus plan in the United States in January 2021, accompanied by an executive order restricting government contracts with foreign companies.
So what can be done with multilateralism to reverse these unfavorable prospects?
Reshaping multilateralism with COVID-19 underway
Different policies can generate positive synergies despite the devastating effects of the pandemics on developed and developing economies. In 2020, massive debt impacted a variety of policy areas. The G-20 initiative to suspend debt relief (October) followed by Zambia’s moratorium (November) highlighted this issue. Debt spiral prevents a quick return to normal for successful long-term public investments. Domestic markets will not easily recover from reliance on government vouchers. On a global scale, COVID-19 has halted the tentative recovery of 2008 on routes. High debts and financial crises limit the states’ scope for action. Even in the communitarian area (Eurozone) the crisis encountered different effects and reactions. In addition, companies that have benefited from a loan extension become largely indebted afterwards.
Debt rescheduling efforts to avoid a second sovereign debt crisis could consider remonetizing the growing debts of the worst-hit economies a systemic task guided by multilateral institutions. In this case, convergence of national policies would depend on a renewed institutional framework. While we cannot rely on leadership claims alone to bring about convergence in egocentric national politics, the lessons learned since 2008 can turn a post-pandemic scenario into a faster landing. One of them is to accelerate the transition to a “greener” economy.
China has taken the lead in a number of steps in this direction since 2007 when the phrase “ecological civilization”Traktion unter Präsident Hu Jintao (Weng, Dong, Wu & Quinv, 2015). Diese Politik war teilweise für die Erholung nach 2008 verantwortlich (und für das BIP-Wachstum 2020, das unter den G20-Volkswirtschaften einzigartig ist). Im chinesischen Kontext Ökologisierung der Wirtschaft verschmolz nach Jahrzehnten von Marktreformen, die unter der Führung von Deng Xiaoping (Hong 2016) durchgeführt wurden, und der Lernkurve einer sich schnell industrialisierenden Gesellschaft, die kein ähnliches Tempo der politischen Liberalisierung erlebte.
Die chinesische Konzeption eines solchen Übergangs beinhaltet zum einen massive staatliche Investitionen in „alte“ Industrie und Dienstleistungen, die durch anhaltende Einsparungen unterstützt werden. Zweitens die Übertragung von Übergangskosten auf Tochterunternehmen und Unternehmen durch technologische Sprünge, wodurch das zentrale Management gestärkt wird. In einem späteren Stadium (2010er Jahre) förderte Präsident Xi Jinping eine ehrgeizige öffentliche Diplomatie, die mit einem nachhaltigeren Wirtschaftsmodell verbunden ist (obwohl die chinesischen Staats- und Regierungschefs das Konzept der „grünen Wirtschaft“ nicht anwenden) und das internationale Publikum in einem Vakuum der US-Führung ansprach .
Dennoch bleiben einige Mängel sichtbar. Ökologisierung der Wirtschaft verstärkte die Überwachungskapazitäten des chinesischen Staates sowie die regionalen Unterschiede. Darüber hinaus sind von China geführte Initiativen im Zusammenhang mit ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (Belt and Road Initiative) nicht an Vorstellungen von Nachhaltigkeit gebunden – was die Anwendbarkeit dieses Modells in multilateralen Umgebungen einschränkt.
Einige Verbindlichkeiten und Grenzen eines chinesischen Weges können abgewendet werden, indem frühzeitig ein Multi-Stakeholder-Ansatz gewählt wird, der einen kooperativen Ansatz für den wirtschaftlichen Übergang fördert. Dies schließt eine schnelle Lösung für Pandemieprobleme aus – laut Chatham House werden im Laufe von 15 Jahren 93 Billionen Pfund benötigt, um eine grüne Wirtschaft in Großbritannien zu erreichen. Es kann jedoch einen mutigeren, breiteren Schatten der Zukunft aufwerfen, der mit einer Vielzahl von Umständen vereinbar ist, die unter dem Einfluss multilateraler Vorschriften stehen.
Derzeit ist das Gesamtbild ein unkoordiniertes Handeln, das durch eine lose Normativität (das Pariser Abkommen) geregelt wird und unterschiedliche häusliche Umstände berücksichtigt. Durch die Bewertung von Kosten und Risiken, um ein Gleichgewicht zwischen Umwelt und Wirtschaft herzustellen, versuchen die Staaten, soziale Akteure einzubeziehen, um die Wirtschaft während der Krise am Laufen zu halten. Aufgrund des systemischen Drucks kam es bis 2019 zu einem Übergang zu einer „grüneren“ Wirtschaft, bei dem der Wettbewerb in einem Kontext begrenzter Normativität genehmigt wurde. Unter den Stämmen von COVID-19 a partielle Governance Es ist ein Szenario möglich, in dem die Initiative zwischen Staaten und IOs sowie zwischen subnationalen Akteuren und Unternehmen wechselt. Inkrementelle Reformen auf internationaler Ebene in Verbindung mit einer ehrgeizigen Überarbeitung der Entwicklungsmodelle im Inland gehen über das Streben nach Schadensreduzierung durch Risikomanagement hinaus und fördern multilaterale Ambitionen.
Wirtschaftsreformpakete der EU und der USA können, obwohl sie immer noch auf nationale Variablen ausgerichtet sind, „Leckagen“ für andere Akteure und Themenbereiche auslösen. Durch die Verschmelzung wirtschaftlicher Impulse und Nachhaltigkeit auf komplexe Weise wirken sich solche öffentlichen Maßnahmen auf Bereiche aus, in denen mehrere gegenseitige Abhängigkeiten bestehen, und rufen andere internationale Maßnahmen ins Spiel. Dieses Szenario impliziert eine Neuformulierung der nationalen Verpflichtungen im Einklang mit einem überarbeiteten Pariser Abkommen (ein Thema, das während des Gipfeltreffens zum Tag der Erde in Biden hervorgehoben wurde und auf der Tagesordnung der COP-26 steht). Die Spannungen zwischen den Volkswirtschaften und dem Lebensunterhalt der Planeten sind bereits mit neu gewonnener Dringlichkeit auf der multilateralen Agenda der Gegenwart angekommen. In dieser Hinsicht können sowohl Versuche einer nationalen Erholung als auch ein unhöfliches Erwachen zu einer „grüneren“ Wirtschaft letztendlich dem Schicksal des Multilateralismus zugute kommen – wenn auch indirekt.
In diesem Artikel haben wir die Aussichten für eine multilaterale Zusammenarbeit in einem Pandemiekontext hervorgehoben. Obwohl die Entwicklungen von COVID-19 Staaten und Volkswirtschaften weiter voneinander trennen, kann ein neuer Vorstoß der Biden-Regierung in einer Reihe von Themenbereichen Schwerpunkte setzen und das Vertrauen in multilaterale Bestrebungen teilweise wiederherstellen. Zentrifugale Hilfspakete können durch gegenseitige Abhängigkeiten in Einklang gebracht werden, zu denen die wachsende Verschuldung ein wichtiger Anreiz ist. Aufbauend auf wiederkehrenden Lehren führen Übergänge zu „grüneren“ Volkswirtschaften zu zusätzlichen Lücken zwischen den öffentlichen Politiken. Schließlich wird der Zugang zu Impfstoffen ermöglicht a Grundbedürfnis verbessert die aufkommende Governance globaler Gesundheitsdienste, die durch die öffentlich-private Partnerschaft COVAX Facility symbolisiert wird.
Chatham House (2021). Überlegungen zum Aufbau einer integrativeren globalen Governance: Zehn Einblicke in die aufkommende Praxis. Synthesepapier, Büro des Direktors, Programm für internationales Recht (April 2021). London: Chatham House.
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 World Bank figures